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NOTE
KESSLER SYNDROME:
A UNITED STATES' STATUTORY SOLUTION FOR SATELLITE DEBRIS
REMOVAL AND THE MITIGATION OF ORBITAL COLLISIONS
RichardL. Hermer-Fried
I.

INTRODUCTION

Circling the Earth are thousands of satellites in predetermined orbits,' each costing
2
hundreds of millions of dollars to manufacture and launch. In 2015 alone, the global satellite
3
Satellites provide essential services including
industry earned $208 billion in revenue.
global positioning system ("GPS"), communications, trading commerce, metrological data,4
internet access, 5 and military/national security. Without satellites "the global information
infrastructure would cease to function."'
In addition to the satellites, there are over 500,000 debris fragments caught in orbit
8
moving at speeds that can destroy a satellite upon impact. As the quantity of debris increases
over time, the probability of satellite collisions with debris exponentially increases.

'J.D Candidate, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, 2020. 1 would like to extend gratitude
to Professor Daniel Greenwood for his assistance and guidance throughout this publication.
2017),
17,
(Apr.
ESA
Orbits,
of
Types
Agency,
Space
I , European
https://www.esa.int/Our Activities/Space Transportation/Types of orbits. Several orbits are important to note.
Id. Geostationary orbits are orbits where satellites follow the Earth's rotation and remain above a fixed location,
providing coverage for that specific area. Polar Orbits are elliptical orbits where satellites circle the Earth's
poles. Id. Low-Earth Orbits are orbits where satellites circle the Earth at altitudes between 160 km and 1000 km
above the Earth's surface. Id
2 George Leopold, DARPA Seeks to Bring Satellite Costs Back Down to Earth, DEFENSE SYSTEMS (Dec. 13,
2013), https://defensesystems.com/articles/2013/12/13/darpa-space-access.aspx.
OWEN BROWN ET AL., Sci. APPLICATIONS INT'L CORP., ORBITAL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT STUDY: REPORT
ON SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENTS, FRAMEWORKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at 4 (2016),

.

2
2
2
O
http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/pages/images/stories/Orbital%2Traffic%2Mgmt% 0report% 0from`%
SAIC.pdf.
4 USC Global Security Staff, What are Satellites Used For?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 15,
4
2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/what-are-satellites-used-for#.XDfGNM9Kiu
5 See Nathan Hurst, Why Satellite Internet is the New Space Race, PCMAG (Jul. 30, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.pcmag.com/article/362695/why-satellite-internet-is-the-new-space-race.
6 See Jeff Foust, U.S. Air Force Releasing More Data on Orbits ofMilitary Satellites, SPACE NEWS (Dec. 17,
2018), https://spacenews.com/u-s-air-force-releasing-more-data-on-orbits-of-military-satellites/.
BROWN ET AL., supra note 3 at 4.
8 See Saheli Roy Choudhury, Space Junk is a Big Problem and It's Going to Get Worse, CNBC (Sept. 18,
2018, 4:51 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/18/wef-tianjin-space-junk-is-a-big-problem-and-its-going-toget-worse.html. See also Joel Achenbach, Debris From Satellites' Collision Said to Pose Small Risk to Space
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp2009),
12,
(Feb.
POST
WASHINGTON
Station,
dyn/content/article/2009/02/1 l/AR2009021103387.html?noredirect-on.
9 Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris (MMOD), NATIONAL AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
2016),
14,
(Jun.
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Collisions, in turn, often destroy the satellite. These possible collisions pose a multitude of
risks for commercial entities, national governments, and the international community.o
In 1978, Donald Kessler, former head of the National Aeronautic and Space
Administration ("NASA") Orbital Debris Program Office, published a hypothesis predicting
that debris created from collisions between objects in Earth's orbit will lead to a "cascade
effect". " The hypothesis, known as Kessler Syndrome, predicts the cascade effect will
exponentially increase debris in orbit, causing additional orbital collisions,12 which, in turn,
increases the debris and the likelihood of additional collisions. Kessler Syndrome will leave
the impacted orbital zones 13 unusable due to this cycle of debris and collisions, thus
effectively ending exploration, communication, and scientific experimentation in space. 14
For this reason, Kessler Syndrome is a major concern for both governments and business
entities. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's simulation predicts current trends will
lead to 50 orbital collisions per day by 2100, culminating in Kessler Syndrome sometime in
the 2 1 century. 15
Current regulation is inadequate to fend off this space debris apocalypse. The 1973
United Nations Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
("The Convention on Liability") assigns liability for damages caused by Space Objects, such
as satellites or their remnants.' 6 The Convention on Liability was ratified by over 80 nations
including the United States of America ("U.S."), The Russian Federation, and The People's
Republic of China. 17 However, The Convention on Liability, modeled on a tort system,
merely allows victims of collisions to impose liability on identified tortfeasors. 18
Unfortunately, identifying the definitive origin of debris involved in an orbital collision is
difficult, since tracking technology can only detect debris of a certain size.' 9 Accordingly, in

https://www.nasa.gov/centers/wstf/sitctour/remotehypervelocitytest laboratory/micrometeoroid andorbita
I debris.html.
10 See BROWN ET AL., supranote 3.
"' NATIONAL AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION,
12 Id.

supra note 9.

13 BROWN ET AL., supra note 3 at 2-3. Kessler Syndrome can occur in different orbital zones. Orbital zones
exist in three dimensions. There are several classifications of geocentric orbit that include Low-Earth orbit
("LEO"), Medium Earth orbit ("MEO"), high-earth orbit ("HEO"), geosynchronous orbit ("GEO"). Id There is
also elliptical orbit, such as polar orbits. Each classification of orbital zone can experience Kessler Syndrome
independent of other orbital zones). Id.
14 Andrea Gini, Don Kessler on Envisat and the Kessler Syndrome, SPACE SAFETY MAGAZINE (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/kessler-syndrome/don-kessler-envisat-kessler-syndrome/.

is

See SERGEI NIKOLAEv ET AL., BRUTE FORCE MODELING OF THE KESSLER SYNDROME, (Lawrence

Livemore National Laboratory ed.) (2012).
16 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects (Mar. 29, 1972), 24 U.S.T.
2389.
17 Id.
s See id.
19 See Hasan Chowdhury, Mega-Constellations of Satellites Increase Space Junk Risk, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29,
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4Oe8dcee-05f8-lle8-9el2-af73e8db3c71; British Broadcasting Corporation,
ISS Crew Take to Escape Capsules in Space Junk Alert, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2012),
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-17497766. See also P. Seitzer ET AL., Detection of Optically
FaintGEO Debris, NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFFICE, 16 Orbital Debris Issue. 4 (Oct. 2012). See also
COMM. ON SPACE DEBRIS ET AL., ORBITAL DEBRIS: A TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT 31-38 (Nat'l Acad. Press

1995).
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most cases, the source of the debris will escape liability under The Convention on Liability.
A new legal framework is required to solve the issue.
Currently, while removing debris from orbit may be technically possible, it is not
commercially practical. 20 Astroscale, an orbital debris removal company based in
Singapore,2 1 projects "the cost of removing debris is between $100 million to $500 million
for a single removal." 22
This note offers a solution based on changing the rules of corporate liability for the
commercial satellite industry, holding corporations liable for increasing orbital debris.
Commercial enterprises are involved in the development and manufacturing of both privately
owned and publicly owned satellites. If the law effectively holds commercial entities liable
for orbital debris, it will give businesses incentives to find new methods to remove their
satellites, minimizing orbital debris. The proposed legal system is comprised of two
components.
Component I is a U.S. Federal Statute that indenmifies parties who are injured by
23
orbital debris. Since the U.S. operates the majority of satellites in orbit, regulating U.S.
satellites provides the greatest impact for debris mitigation. The proposed statute contains
several functions: a new insurance system, a system of indemnification, funding to remove
orbital debris, and new liability standards that include piercing the corporate veil.
Component II is an Executive Agreement between the U.S. and its trade partners to
follow the regulations in component I.
The purpose for both components is to incentivize de-orbiting satellites, to penalize
failing to de-orbit satellites, and to secure funds for developing technology to clean orbital
debris.
BACKGROUND
II.
A.

Kessler Syndrome

Kessler Syndrome is a scientific principle explaining the exponential increase of
24
Out of the
orbital debris due to space object collisions and predicting its future course.
25
satellites.
are
operating
1,957
only
hundreds of millions of space objects in earth's orbit,
The remainder consists of debris, such as dead satellites and debris from satellites such as

See Saheli Roy Choudhury, Space Junk is a Big Problem and It's Going to Get Worse, CNBC (Sept. 18,
2018, 4:51 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/18/wef-tianjin-space-junk-is-a-big-problem-and-its-going-toget-worse.html. See also Leonard David, Space Junk Menace: How to Deal with Orbital Debris (Jan. 25,
2013), https://www.space.com/19445-space-junk-threat-orbital-debris-cleanup.html.
21 ASTROSCALE, https://astroscale.com/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2019).
22 Saheli Roy Choudhury, Space Junk is a Big Problem and It's Going to Get Worse, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2018,
4:51 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/18/wef-tianjin-space-junk-is-a-big-problem-and-its-going-to-getworse.html.
23 See UCS Satellite Database, In-Depth Details on the 1,957 Satellites Currently Orbiting Earth, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTIST (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellitedatabase#.W7kmW5NKhnA.
24 NATIONAL AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9.
20

25 See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTIST, supra note 23.
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nuts and bolts or paint chips.2 6 According to the European Space Agency ("E.S.A."), "as of
January 2018, there are about 29,000 objects larger than 10 centimeters, around 750,000
objects that range between 1 cm to 10 cm and about 166 million objects between 1 millimeter
to 1 cm in size." 2 7 Small debris objects in orbit move at 28,163 kilometers per hour2 8 with the
kinetic energy capable of obliterating objects they contact.29
B.

Evidence of the Kessler Syndrome

In 2007, without warning, the Chinese government launched a kinetic kill vehicle at
a Chinese weather satellite, successfully destroying the satellite. 30 The result was the largest
recorded creation of space debris in history with more than 3,000 pieces of traceable size and
an estimated 150,000 debris particles.3 1 The debris will likely remain in orbit for centuries.
In 2011, debris from the Chinese collision passed 6 kilometers away from the International
Space Station ("ISS").32
In 2008, the crew heading to the ISS on the shuttle Endeavor was struck by small
pieces of orbital debris, which caused damage to one of the windows.
In 2009, the crew on
the ISS was forced to seek safety due to the threat of a debris flyby. 34 In 2016, the ISS was
struck by what is likely a paint chip that caused a 7-millimeter crack in an observation
window.35
In 2009, an active U.S. commercial satellite, Iridium 33, collided with a dead
Russian military communication satellite, Kosmos 2251.3 The collision is the first major
collision between two satellites and yielded thousands of fragments of debris.37 All previous

26

Saadia Pekkanen, Why Space Debris Cleanup Is a National Security Threat, REAL

CLEAR DEFENSE

14,

(Nov.
2018),

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/1 1/14/whyspace debris cleanup is a national security thre
at_113954.html.
27 See Choudhury, supra note
22.
28 Joel Achenbach, Debris From Satellites' Collision Said to Pose Small Risk to Space
Station, WASHINGTON
POST
(Feb.
12,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpostcom/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/1 1/AR2009021103387.html?noredirect-on.
29 See Choudhury, supra
note 22.
30 Leonard David, China's Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud Circles Earth, SPACE.COM
(Feb. 2,
2007), https://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html.
31 British Broadcasting Corporation, ISS Crew Take to Escape Capsules in Space Junk Alert, BBC NEWS (Mar.
24, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-l17497766.
32 Kimberly Segal, NASA: Space Junk Passes Less Than 4 Miles from Space Station (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:24 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/201 1/US/04/05/space.station.debris/index.html?hpt-T2.
13 NASA, Orbital Debris, Volume 13, Issue 2 (April 2009).
34 Id.

3 Johannes Van Zijl, Space Debris hit the InternationalSpace Station Causing Small Crack in Window, THE
SCIENCE EXPLORER (May 13, 2016), http://thescienceexplorer.com/technology/space-debris-hit-intemationalspace-station-causing-small-crack-window.
36 Becky lanotta & Tariq Malik, U.S. Satellite Destroyed in Space Collision, SPACE.COM (Feb. 11, 2009, 6:00
PM), https://www.space.com/5542-satellite-destroyed-space-collision.html.
37 See Saadia Pekkanen, Why Space Debris Cleanup Is a National Security Threat, REAL CLEAR DEFENSE
(Nov.
14,
2018),
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/l1/14/why space -debris cleanup is_a_national securitythre
at_113954.html. See also OWEN BROWN ET AL.,

Scl. APPLICATIONS INT'L CORP.,

ORBITAL TRAFFIC
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collisions were between artificial satellites and space debris, 3 such as a 1996 collision
39
The Iridium collision
involving a European booster that collided with a French Spacecraft.
1,000 objects at
including
orbit,
earth
with Kosmos resulted in 19,000 objects in low and high
potentially
collision
this
least 10 centimeters large in orbit, as of 2009.40 The debris from
41
years.
10,000
threatens other satellites in low-earth orbit ("LEO") for the next
USA 109, a
Increases in orbital debris occur even without collisions.
due
to a battery
meteorological satellite that had been in orbit for 20 years, exploded
42
tracked an
radar
"[m]ilitary
Dr. Saadia Pekkanen says,
malfunction in February 2015.
shards
untraceable
50,000
estimated 100 debris pieces from USA 109, and estimate another
43
NOAAsatellite,
In November of 2015, another meteorological
larger than 1 millimeter."
16, broke into a debris cloud of 136 traceable pieces after a battery failure." As of early
2018, "the E.S.A. estimates that there have been about 500 break-ups, collisions, explosions,
45
or other fragmentation events to date that yielded space debris."
One of the 500,000 traceable objects in orbit is Envisat, which the E.S.A. designed
and launched. Envisat was the world's largest civilian Earth observation satellite, but now is
a potential threat to human activity in space.
These instances demonstrate the immediate harm caused by orbital debris collisions.
Absent effective preventive measures, increases in debris will lead to Kessler Syndrome and a
dark age to commercial use of space.4 7

MANAGEMENT STUDY:
RECOMMENDATIONS,

REPORT ON SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
at

ASSESSMENTS, FRAMEWORKS AND
(2016),

4

2
2
2
http://www.spacepolicyonine.com/pages/images/stories/Orbital%2Traffic%2Mgmt% 0report% 0from% 0
SAIC.pdf.
38 See lanottasupra note 36.
3 See Pekkanen, supra note 26.
4 Veronika Oleksyn, What A Mess! Experts Ponder Space Junk Problem, USA TODAY (Feb. 19, 2009),
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/science/space/2009-02-19-space-junkN.htm.
41 Id.
42

See Pekkanen, supranote 26.

43 Id.

44Id.
45 Id.

4 See Peter B. de Selding, Envisat to Pose Big OrbitalDebris Threatfor 150 Years, Experts Say, SPACE NEWS
("ESA
(Jul. 23, 2010), https://spacenews.com/envisat-pose-big-orbital-debris-threat-150-years-experts-say/.
lost contact with Envisat in 2012, 10 years after it launched. Envisat cost $2.9 billion to develop and launch
with a life expectancy of 5 years. Envisat's total mass is 8,000 kg. The failure to remove the massive dead
satellite from orbit along with the inability to control the satellite concerns experts knowing the high probability
of collision."). See also Andrea Gini, Don Kessler on Envisat and the Kessler Syndrome, SPACE SAFETY
MAGAZINE (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/kessler-syndrome/don-kesslerenvisat-kessler-syndrome/("Experts estimate Envisat will naturally fall from Earth's orbit after 150 years. Each
year, Envisat's orbit takes the satellite within 200 meters from contact of two catalogued objects.").
47 See Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency ofArtificialSatellites: The Creation of
a

Debris

Belt,

83

J.

OF

GEOPHYSICAL

RES.

http://www.castor2.ca/07 News/headline_010216 files/KesslerCollisionFrequency 1978.pdf.

2637,(1978),

See

also

OWEN BROWN ET AL., SCI. APPLICATIONS INT'L CORP., ORBITAL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT STUDY: REPORT ON
SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENTS, FRAMEWORKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at 4 (2016),

http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/pages/images/stories/Orbital%2Traffic%
SAIC.pdf.

2

2
2
2
Mgmt%/Oreport% 0froi% O
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C.

Current Orbital Environment

In 2005, NASA stated if no further objects were launched into orbit, collisions
between already extant satellites will create debris fragments faster than atmospheric drag
will remove fragments.48 In other words, we are already past the point of "sustainability"
barring novel interventions. 4 9
Figure 1: NASA Produced Image of Debris in Earth's Orbit 50

See Vice: A Kurdish State and Out of Space (HBO television broadcast Jul. 6, 2018).
See Leonard David, Space Junk Menace: How to Deal with Orbital Debris (Jan. 25, 2013),
https://www.space.com/I 9445-space-junk-tireat-orbital-debris-cleanup.html.
so See Pekkanen, supra note 26.
4

4
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Figure 2: NASA Produced Graph of Debris Concentration in Low-Earth Orbit 5'
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Megaconstellations

Megaconstellations are satellite constellations containing hundreds or thousands of
52
According to the E.S.A.,
satellites operated by a single entity in a specific orbital zone.
"satellite megaconstellations are becoming a popular solution for global telecommunications
coverage." 53 Megaconstellations appeal to business because they seem to be cost-effective, at
least in the short run. Corporations such as SpaceX, OneWeb, Airbus, Boeing, ViaSat are
54
working to launch their own megaconstellations.
Unfortunately, megaconstellations radically increase the likelihood of Kessler
Currently, "there are about 1,900 active satellites in orbit; megaconstellations
Syndrome.
56
The number of satellites is not
could push that number close to 20,000 in the next decade."
the only factor that concerns scientists; it is also the concentration of satellites "as dozens of
57
According to Donald
conjunctions are likely to happen with large constellations per day."

5 Debra Werner, Will MegaconstellationsCause a DangerousSpike in OrbitalDebris, SPACE NEWS (Nov. 15,
2018), https://spacenews.com/will-megaconstellations-cause-a-dangerous-spike-in-orbital-debris/.
52 Hasan Chowdhury, Mega-ConstellationsofSatellites Increase Space Junk Risk, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/40e8dcee-05f8-1 1e8-9e12-af73e8db3c71.
European Space Agency, A Satellite Mega-Constellation, ESA (July 18, 2018, 4:31 PM)
53
https://www.esa.int/spaceinimages/Images/2018/07/Asatellite-mega-constellation.
54
Jonathon Amos, Satellite Mega-Constellation Production Begins, BBC (Jun. 27, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-40422011.
5 Werner, supra note 51.
56 id.
57

Id.
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Kessler, "these collisions could cause a cascade effect, where crashes become more and more
frequent so that LEO becomes too crowded to safely sustain satellites."s 8
NASA scientists express concerns over megaconstellations, specifically Starlink,5 9
arguing "nearly all of these satellites - 99 percent - will need to be taken out of orbit as soon
as they have completed their time in space. This should prevent the number of collisions
between satellites from increasing over the next few centuries."a According to NASA's
analytics, "if only 90 percent of these large constellations were de-orbited on time . . . the
number of collisions would be about 260 over the next 200 years . . . if 99 percent [de-orbit]
in time, then only 34 crashes would happen in the same time period." 6
Donald Kessler expresses skepticism on whether corporations will strictly follow
government guidelines for debris mitigation62 and questions corporations' sincerity: "[iun the
past, only about half of current operations have followed the existing 25-year guidelines, with
63
the U.S. having the worst record. This is possibly due to a lack of enforceable regulations."
In Kessler's words, "commercial organizations seek to provide services as inexpensively as
5

Loren Grush, As Satellite Constellations Grow Larger, NASA is WorriedAbout Orbital Debris, THE VERGE

(Sept. 28, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/28/17906158/nasa-spacex-oneweb-satellitelarge-constellations-orbital-debris.
5 Debra Werner, Will Megaconstellations Cause a Dangerous Spike in OrbitalDebris, SPACE NEWS (Nov. 15,

2018),

https://spacenews.com/will-megaconstellations-cause-a-dangerous-spike-in-orbital-debris/

(SpaceX

received U.S. FCC approval in March 2018, to launch "4,425 satellites into its Starlink broadband constellation
...
and is seeking permission in November 2018 to launch 7,518 more satellites in low-earth orbit.").See
Stephen Clark, Test Satellitesfor SpaceX's Broadband 'Megaconstellation'Set for Launch, SPACEFLIGHT NOW
(Feb.
20,
2018),
https://spaceflightnow.com/2018/02/20/test-satellites-for-spacexs-broadbandmegaconstellation-set-for-launch/ (The FCC approved the SpaceX satellite constellation on the basis that,
"satellite technology can help reach Americans who live in rural or hard-to-serve places where fiber optic
cables and cell towers do not reach . . . offering more competition where terrestrial Internet access is already
available"). See also Loren Grush, As Satellite Constellations Grow Larger, NASA is Worried About Orbital
Debris, THE VERGE (Sept. 28, 2018, 10:05 AM) https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/28/17906158/nasa-spacexoneweb-satellite-large-constellations-orbital-debris.When the FCC approved SpaceX's license for its internet
satellite constellation, it did say that the company will need to provide an updated description of the orbital
debris mitigation plans for its system, despite providing details and analysis in its filing. SpaceX told the FCC it
would de-orbit its satellites within five to seven years Id; Mallory Locklear, SpaceX Revises Internet Satellite
Launch
Plan
to
Minimize
Space
Debris,
ENGADGET
(Nov.
9,
2018),

https://www.engadget.com/2018/1l/09/spacex-starlink-satellite-launch-plan-space-debris/.

SpaceX has sent

two prototype satellites into Orbit for the Starlink Project, both failed to move into the planned altitude. SpaceX
is now asking the FCC if they can lower the orbit for their planned Starlink project, SpaceX stating, "if a
satellite happens to fail and SpaceX can no longer de-orbit it as planned, the lower altitude orbit can help the
company dispose of that satellite in a timely manner" because of gravity and other natural factors. SpaceX
plans to launch 12,000 satellites into orbit as part of Starlink. Id.
6 See Grush, supra note 58.
61 Id.
62

Debris mitigation takes into account two primary factors, the 1,957 operating satellites and the debris

fragments. 1,232 operating satellites are low-earth orbit or 62.95 percent of operating satellites. 126 operating

satellites are medium-earth orbit or 6.43 percent of operating satellites. 41 satellites are elliptical orbit or 2.09
percent of operating satellites. 558 operating satellites are geosynchronous orbit or 28.51 percent of operating
satellites). See Andrea Gini, Don Kessler on Envisat and the Kessler Syndrome, SPACE SAFETY MAGAZINE
(Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/kessler-syndrome/don-kessler-envisatkessler-syndrome/. See also UCS Satellite Database, In-Depth Details on the 1,957 Satellites Currently
Orbiting Earth, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTIST (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclearweapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.W7kmW5NKhmA.
63 See Werner, supra
note 51.
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64
possible to maximize profit, [but] following guidelines adds cost," so there is an economic
incentive for corporations to cheat. Kessler sees the likely behavior of self-interested
65
corporations as an example of the tragedy of the commons: "you prosper the most if you do
the most but it's not good for the environment . . the environment can be contaminated for
everybody." 66

E.

Automation

In order to prevent orbital collisions in megaconstellations, corporations are relying
67
on automation/artificial intelligence to maneuver satellites.
According to Ted Muelbaupt,
associate principal director for The Aerospace Corporation's systems analysis and simulation
subdivision, corporations relying on automation to mitigate orbital collisions are acting in an
irresponsible manner.68
If Kessler Syndrome occurs, then essential services provided by satellites, such as
global communication and commerce will be forced to shutdown with no land-based
69
In order to
alternatives readily available, thus leading to a global economic depression.
prevent a global economic depression caused by Kessler Syndrome, a new system of
corporate liability must be imposed on the satellite industry. The current international law on
70
space object liability has failed to hold any state entity or private entity liable for damages.

m.
A.

I -ANALYSIS

The International Law for Assigning Liability

Current law assigning liability is ineffective in preventing the increase of orbital
71
The Outer Space Treaty and The Convention on
debris and orbital debris collisions.
Liability are the two primary international agreements designed to protect the interests of

6 Id.
65 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243-1248 (1986).
66 See Werner, supra note 51.
67 Id.

68 See Debra Weiner, Will Megaconstellations Cause a DangerousSpike in OrbitalDebris, SPACE NEWS (Nov.

15, 2018), https://spacenews.com/will-megaconstellations-cause-a-dangerous-spike-in-orbital-debris/ (stating
that Ted Muelhaupt believes, "while automation works well for large constellations, it can create problems for
satellites in the vicinity. Constellation operators could maneuver at a frequency that is not within the timelines
of traditional satellite operators. If you want to take a day to decide to execute a maneuver and the
megaconstellations have artificial intelligence making decisions on the fly, none of that fits into your plans").
69 George Dvorsky, What Would Happen IfAll Our Satellites Were Suddenly Destroyed?, GIZMODO (Jun. 4,
https:/io9.gizmodo.com/what-would-happen-if-all-our-satellites-were-suddenly-dPM),
2:00
2015,
1709006681.
7o See Michael J. Listner, Reflections on ROSAT, Orbital Space Debris, and the Future of Space Law, THE
SPACE REvIEw (Oct. 17, 2011), http://thespacereview.com/article/1948/1.
71 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 3.

267

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

9

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 9
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

nations in space.
Neither agreement includes a legal course of action when a satellite
collides with a debris cloud destroying the satellite. 3
B.

Outer Space Treaty

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty established an international framework applying
international law to disputes in outer space, in order to allow States to explore space
peacefully without the interference of other States. 74 Specifically, "Article VI provides that
each State is responsible for its "non-governmental entities" and all national governmental
agencies;" while Articles VII and VIII assign liability to state parties "responsible for
damage caused on the Earth, in air space, or in outer space by that State's space objects and
their component parts." 7 6
As Benjamin Jacobs has explained, the Outer Space Treaty, which predates
widespread recognition of the Kessler Syndrome problem, was not intended to address it and
does not do so:
First, the Treaty lacks a specific definition of the phrase "component
parts," and the extent to which unintended debris could fall within this
category is unclear. This is a significant problem, because not all debris
would necessarily be described as a component part. Larger pieces of
space debris, such as discarded fuel canisters, could be uncontroversially
classified as components. The classification of smaller debris, such as
flecks of paint, is more ambiguous. Second, the Treaty does not establish a
legal standard for liability."

72

Id. at C-3.

73

See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,

Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Jan. 27, 1967, 19 UST 7570; Convention on Intemational
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389.
7
See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including
the
Moon
and
Other
Celestial
Bodies.
Jan.
27,
1967,
19
UST
7570.
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm.
7 Benjamin Jacobs, Debris Mitigation CertiicationAnd The CommercialSpace Industry: A New Weapon In
The Fight Against Space Pollution, 20 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 117, 119 (2011).
76 Id. at 119-120.
n Id. at 120.
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C.

United Nations Convention on International Liability for Damaged Caused by
Space Objects 8

Following the Outer Space Treaty, the United Nations organized The Convention on
Liability, with the "interest of all mankind in furthering the exploration and use of outer space
9
for peaceful purposes."
The Convention on Liability was inspired by the failure of the Outer Space Treaty to
address concerns of damage liability: The Convention on Liability "recognize[ed] the need to
elaborate effective international rules and procedures concerning liability for damage caused
by space objects and to ensure, in particular, the prompt payment under the terms of [The
Convention on Liability] a full and equitable measure of compensation to victims of such
damage." 80 The Convention on Liability was established to impose liability for damages
caused by space objects, but is primarily concerned with damages from Space Objects falling
to earth, 81 such as when the fuel tank of Iridium crashed into a California walnut orchard -in
October 2018.82 Unfortunately, the Convention on Liability does an inadequate job dealing
with damages caused by space objects colliding with one another and fails to address the
impending problem of Kessler Syndrome because its provisions 'imposing liability for
creating orbital debris are limited and ineffective.
The Convention on Liability creates injury liability guidelines for nations launching
and orbiting satellites in space. 84 Under The Convention on Liability, only States, not
corporations, are potentially liable:

'

[T]he launching State shall be liable to pay for damage in accordance with
international law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to
provide such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the person,
natural or juridical, State or international organization on whose behalf the
claim is presented to the condition which would have existed if the damage
had not occurred.8
The Convention assumes that most disputes will be settled diplomatically. If the parties
cannot agree on a settlement through diplomatic negotiation, the "parties concerned shall
See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T.
2389 (currently, 89 states have ratified The Convention on Liability, 22 have signed but not ratified, and three
international intergovernmental organizations, The European Space Agency (ESA), the European Organization
for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EOEMS), and the European Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (ETSO) have declared their acceptance of the right and obligations provided for in the
agreement).
7 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389.
78

80 Id.
8
82

See Listner, supra note 70.
Pekkanen, supra note 26.

83 See Scott Kerr, Liabilityfor Space Debris Collisions and Kessler Syndrome (Part1), THE SPACE REVIEW

(Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3387/1.
" See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T.

2389.
85 Id.
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establish a Claims Commission at the request of either party," 86 ,composed of three members;
one appointed by the claimant State; one appointed by the launching State and the Third
member; the chairman, to be chosen by both parties jointly." 87 The initial proposal for a
Claims Commission generated debate over choice of law rules and scope of liability. The
resulting compromise created an ineffective and weak legal authority. 8
Given The Convention on Liability's limited reach, only one action has been filed to
date, involving the 1978 crash of the nuclear-powered Soviet satellite Cosmos 954.9 In that
action, Canada and the Soviet Union settled out of court; 90 therefore no case law involving
The Convention on Liability exists.
D.

Issues with The Convention on Liability

The Convention makes a State responsible for all space objects that are launched
from its territory.91 This creates seriously perverse incentives for businesses to shift their
launches to whichever country regulates least, is most likely to ignore international law or
absorb damages itself without passing them through to the offending corporation, or has the
most easily bribed officials." Perhaps this is why many U.S. corporations launch satellites
from Kazakhstan. 93 Or perhaps not: the geography and location of Kazakhstan makes it a
strategic site to launch rockets. 94
A more important weakness, and perhaps the reason why only one action has ever
been filed is The Convention on Liability's reliance on fault-based liability principles. 9 s

86
87

Id.
Id.

88 See Joseph A. Burke Note, Convention on InternationalLiability for Damage Caused by Space Objects:
Definition and DeterminationofDamages After the Cosmos 954 Incident, 8 FORDHAM L. J. 255, 285 (1984).
89 Elizabeth Howell, If the FallingChinese Space Station Hits You, Is Anyone Liable, LIVE SCIENCE (Mar. 26,
2018, 6:44 A.M.), http://www.livescience.com/62118-if-chinese-space-station-hits-you-liability.html.
90 Id.

91

See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T.
2389.
92 See generally Business Ant-Corruption Portal, Kazakhstan Corruption Report, GAN (Jul. 2016),
https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/kazakhstan/; see also Wired Staff, Kazakhstan
Launches Satellite, WIRED (Jun. 18, 2006 10:15 AM), https://www.wired.com/2006/06/kazakbstan-launchessatellite/;
Global
Witness,
Kazakhstan,
GLOBAL
WITNESS,
bttps://www.globalwitness.org/en/countries/kazakhstan/?gclid=CjwKCAiAyrXiBRAjEiwATI95mWwUHRjV
yldUc-foVZrNQHOvTFPz9hlvgSWFmuOlCvLk5F3pMLwvRoCd-kQAvDBwE#more.
S ee also Christina
Wilkie, Kazakhstan is a 'Kleptocracy' Ruled By an Autocrat. It's Also an IncreasinglyImportant Strategic

Ally, CNBC (Jan. 16, 2018 4:22 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/16/kazakhstan-is-a-kleptocracy-ruled-by-an-autocrat-its-also-an-increasinglyimportant-strategic-ally.html (Kazakhstan is known as a country deeply influenced by corruption within its
government. Kazakhstan has little economic global influence, but has a major presence for satellite launches).
93 See Wendover Productions, How to Build a $100 Million Satellite, YOUTUBE (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-30XpSozOZH; see also Eric Berger, Kazakhstan chooses SpaceX over a
Russian Rocket for
Satellite Launch,
ARS
TECHNIA
(Nov.
6,
2018,
6:36
PM),
https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/ ll/kazakhstan-chooses-spacex-over-a-russian-rocket-for-satellite-launch/.
94 See Elizabeth Howell, Baikonur Cosmodrome: Russia Launch Complex, SPACE.COM (Jun. 16, 2018, 12:32
A.M.), https://www.space.com/33947-baikonur-cosmodrome.html.
9s See BROWN ET AL., supra note 3 at C-3.
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Under Article III of The Convention on Liability, causation is not enough to prove fault for
damages occurring in orbit. Instead, a party is "liable only if the damage is due to its fault or
96
the fault of persons for whom it is responsible," and requires an intentional act or omission
97
Even if the damage did result from an intentional
by the party whom caused the damage.
act or omission, it isn't entirely clear whether a private corporation's intent can or should be
imputed to a State that may have no involvement in the relevant decisions other than its bare
hosting of the launch site.
In contrast, Article IV of The Convention on Liability imposes absolute liability on
States that cause damage on Earth's surface or Earth's airspace, but not in outer space or in
Earth's orbit.98 In outer space, accordingly, States that have caused damages may nonetheless
argue issues of fact to defend against imposition of liability on the ground that the damages
99
caused by space objects were not the result of intentional acts or omissions.
In 2015, The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
("C.O.P.U.O.S.") was unable to determine whether non-compliance with C.O.P.U.O.S.
resolution for "Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" fulfills the omission element for fault100
Therefore, The Convention on Liability
based liability under The Convention on Liability.
may fail to award claimant States who are injured by parties failing to comply with debris
mitigation resolutions passed by the United Nations. This standard of liability does not bode
well with consideration toward fault-based liability as it may or may not hold parties
Accordingly the fault-based system of the
accountable for debris they have caused.
Convention will be less effective in preventing Kessler Syndrome'o' than would a strict

liability regime.102
An additional problem is that The Convention on Liability is not clear on whether
0
"orbital debris" is considered "space objects."' o C.O.P.O.U.S. defines orbital debris as "all
man-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the
0
In contrast, The Convention on Liability defines
atmosphere, that are non-functional."'
"objects" as "component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts
thereof."'0 o There is no legal definition for orbital debris and no official commentary on
06
whether orbital debris qualify as space objects.1 Accordingly, it is unclear whether States

96

See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, art. 3, Mar. 29, 1972, 24

U.S.T. 2389.
07 See Kerr, supra note 83.

9 See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, art. 4, Mar. 29, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389.

9 See generally Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389.
100 See Kerr, supra note 83.
101 See id.
102 BROWN ET AL., supra note 3 at C-3.
103

See Kerr, supra note 83.

104 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 3 at C-3.

1(5 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T.

2389.
106 See Kerr, supra note 83.
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are liable for damage caused by orbital debris from space objects launched from their
territory.
Thus, for example, if the debris from the Iridium-Kosmos collision were to collide
with a GPS satellite launched by a private company from Khazakstan, if the U.K. sought to
hold the U.S. and Russia jointly liable for damages,10 7 it would first need to establish that the
debris constitutes "space objects" as defined in the Convention. Then, it would be required to
prove intent or omission on the part of Russia and the US - a difficult task, since neither state
likely intended the collision.
The next issue involves the claims process. Currently, claims can only be brought
up by States against other States. os This leaves victims, whether businesses that lost their
satellites or customers dependent on private or governmental satellites, with no legal remedy
or equitable remedy unless a launching State finds it in its interest to assert the private
claims. 10 For example, the commercial entity Iridium Communications Incorporation was
unable to claim damages in its own name against Russia for the Iridium 33 collision with
Kosmos 2251, since the U.S. is the only entity with the ability to claim damages in this
scenario. One could imagine the claimant State in such a situation deciding that other State
interests - such as relations with the injuring State(s) - were of more importance than the
private claimant's damages, and the claimant state simply refusing to assert a claim. State
enforcement also means that States may decide not to sue allies or to trump up suits against
enemies, for reasons that are entirely external to the regulation of space debris. In the GPS
example described above, Kazakhstan might decide that it wished to avoid offending the U.S.
or Russia, despite the injury to a private satellite enterprise that might well have no other
connection to Kazakhstan.
Lastly, third-person parties that rely on the services provided by the GPS satellite
cannot file claims against Russia or the U.S., since they are not States. Therefore, a mobile
dating application that uses the GPS satellite to match users with each other and cannot
operate if the GPS satellite is destroyed leaving the business and its customers without
service, would be without a remedy, again unless the launching State chose to represent it.
Even if the launching State did bring an action, it is not clear whether this indirect injury
would constitute "damages" under the Convention's limited definition, which seems to focus
on physical injuries rather than consequential damages to customers. 110
One can infer that member States do not expect to gain much from the Convention
process. There have been hundreds of orbital collisions by member States' space objects that
could be liable for damages under The Convention on Liability, but only the 1978 Cosmos
954 collision, resulted in a filed action."'

107

See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, art. 4, Mar. 29, 1972, 24

U.S.T. 2389.
10s

See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T.

2389.
'0 See generally Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972,

24 U.S.T. 2389.
110 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, art. 1, Mar. 29, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389, (The Convention defines damages as "loss of life, personal injury ...
loss of or damage to
property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental
organizations").
1 See Kerr, supra note 83.
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One possible explanation for States deciding not use the Convention process might
be that only a few States are responsible for the majority of satellites and prefer to deal
1 12
Perhaps member States prefer not to
through diplomacy rather than a Claims Commission.
affect diplomatic relations by seeking to hold other States liable for damages; therefore, they
will eat the cost themselves or leave injured commercial entities with no recourse. m
Kazakhstan, for example, may have little interest in bringing actions on behalf of foreign
companies that launch from its territory. Countries like China and Russia have not been held
liable for the creation of thousands of fragments of orbital debris from space object collisions.
The collision between Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 was never litigated for liability, even
1 14
Under The Convention on Liability's
though the aftermath can cause detrimental harm.
rules, Iridium could not file a complaint against Russia, because they are not the launching
State. 11
E.

Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Convention

No independent regulatory agency exists for the purpose of mediating tort liability
between international entities. However, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee ("IADC") is an international independent agency that deals with the mitigation of
orbital debris. IADC is an international forum for the worldwide coordination of activities
The United States, Russian
related to the issues of human-made debris in space. 11
Federation, and the People's Republic of China are all members of this organization.
However, Kazakhstan is not a member of the IADC, which shows a lack of interest in debris

mitigation.

118

Under the current IADC guidelines "[miegaconstellations plan to rely on satellites
designed to work for five to seven years . . under the IADC guidelines, satellite operators are
expected to de-orbit satellites within 25 years of the end of their missions[. A] broadband
constellation launching new satellites into [LEO] every five years, under the 25-year

See Listner, supra note 70.
See generally Michael J. Listner, Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251, Three Years Later, SPACE SAFETY MAG.
225
I(Feb 10, 2012), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/kessler-syndrome/iridium-33-cosmosan
agreement
into
entered
Russia
and
the
U.S.
collision
and
Cosmos
the
Iridium
(After
years-later-learned-then/
to share orbital debris data instead of pursuing legal action for damages from the incident. "[P]olitics, legalities
and economics make the issue with space debris difficult to address").
114 Id.
112
113

" s See Listner, supra note 70.
"6 Dr. Holger Krag, The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), U.N. SPACE L.
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/SLW2016/Panel4/1._KragIADC- 162016),
7,
(Sept.
WORKSHOP
03_UNCOPUOSSpace Law Workshop.pdf. IADC members are countries or national or international space
organizations that carry out space activities, either through manufacturing, launching, and operating spacecraft
or manufacturing and launching rockets. The primary purposes of the IADC are to exchange information on
space debris research activities between member space agencies; to facilitate opportunities for cooperation in
space debris research; to review the progress of ongoing cooperative activities; and to identify debris mitigation
options. Id.
117 Id.
118 See id.
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guideline, could put six generations of satellites into orbit before de-orbiting the first
generation."' 19 Experts have said the 25-year timeframe is too long.1 20
IV.

UNITED STATES LAW ON THE COMMERICAL SPACE SECTOR

The United States Government understands the need to protect the current and
potential economic, social, and national security value associated with outer space assets.121
For example, the U.S. Air Force closely monitors the state of debris by non-stop tracking and
coordination with satellite operators.122 In order to regulate non-governmental commercial
satellites, U.S. Congress vests power within the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"),
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), and the Administrator of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to supervise and assess private entities' activities in
space. 123
A. SPACE Act
In 2015, Congress passed the U.S. Space Launch Competiveness Act ("SPACE
Act"), with the intent "to facilitate a pro-growth environment for the developing commercial
space industry by encouraging private sector investment and creating more stable and
predictable regulatory conditions, and for other purposes."1 2 4 Unfortunately, the SPACE Act
removes liability for third party participants under 51 USCA § 50915 and does not address
commercial satellites contributing to orbital debris. 2 5
The SPACE Act allows for commercial businesses to receive permits in order to
implement innovation in launches and types of machinery. 126 The Act deregulates
commercial space operations, allowing commercial entities greater independent control in
operational launches and reentry.1 2 7 The statute updates how private licenses are distributed
to commercial entities by establishing a system of licenses regulating and creating the Office
of Space Commerce with the mission to foster the conditions for economic growth and
technological advancement of the U.S. space commerce industry.128 The statute is tailored to
coordinate space commerce policy issues and actions within commerce by representing
commerce in the development of U.S. policies and in negotiations with foreign countries
promoting U.S. space commerce.129
1'9 See Werner, supra note 51.
120 Tereza Pultarova, Space Junk Solution? Tiny Cubesat to Test New De-OrbitingThruster, SPACE.COM (July

1, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.space.com/37370-cubesat-deorbit-space-junk-experiment.html.
121 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.

See Vice: A Kurdish State and Out ofSpace (HBO television broadcast July 6, 2018).
John P. Holdren, Commercial Space Launch Act Report, OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/csla report_4-4-16_final.pdf
124 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 51 U.S.C.A.).
125 See id.
126 H.R. Con. Res. 2262, 114th Cong. § 104
(2015) (enacted).
127 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No.
114-90, § 113, 129 Stat. 704 (2015)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of51 U.S.C.A.).
128 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No.
114-90, § 302, 129 Stat. 704 (2015)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of51 U.S.C.A.).
122

.

123

129 See id.
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The SPACE Act revises several Federal Statutes associated with commercial space
flight entities, in order to regulate liability and promote commercial interests. Congress gives
authority to Department of Transportation ("DOT"), NASA, and other Federal Agencies to
1 30
conduct reports and implement regulations to fix the existent Federal Regulation.
B.

U.S. Federal Administrations on Regulating Space

U.S. law provides for an elaborate licensing system, but few substantive
regulations.' 31 Authority is widely dispersed, so no agency has sufficient oversight to identify
and be compelled to deal with the pending Kessler Syndrome issue. None of the existing
32
regulations reduce that danger.'
The Office of Science & Technology ("OST") concluded that:
[T]he economic vitality of the American space industry is best served with
a clear and predictable oversight process that ensures access to space and
imposes minimal burdens on the industry. The administration supports a
narrowly tailored authorization process for newly contemplated
commercial space activities with only such conditions as are necessary for
compliance with the U.S.'s internal obligations, foreign policy and national
security interests, and protection of U.S. Government uses of outer
'33
space.
OST proposes that the oversight of the licensing system enforces "no person that is
subject to the jurisdiction or control of the U.S. may, directly or through subsidiary or
34
affiliate, conduct missions in outer space without authorization."
The U.S. delegates the power to regulate licenses and insurance liability to the
Secretary of Transportation, [who] "after consulting with the Administrator of NASA, the
Secretary of the Air Force, and the heads of other appropriate executive agencies" makes
determinations.' 35 The U.S. relies on intergovernmental expertise to regulate liability, unlike
36
the Convention on International Liability, which relies on the Claims Commission.'
The FAA under the authority of the DOT aims to "[i]mprove efficiency, reduce
unnecessary costs, resolve inconsistencies, remove duplication, and minimize unwarranted

130

See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, § 111 129 Stat. 704 (2015)

(codified as amended in scattered sections of51 U.S.C.A.).
31 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat 704 (2015)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 51 U.S.C.A.).
132 See generally Holdren, supra note 123, (Much of the current regulation for space activates such as launch
services, communications, or remote sensing is regulated by FAA, FCC, or NOAA. The interest of the agencies
is not prioritizing debris mitigation, but the promotion of the U.S. commercial space interest).
1 Holdren, supranote 123.
134 id.
51 U.S.C.A. §50914 (West 2015).
See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 51 U.S.C.A.). See also Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389.
135

136
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constraints."13 7 The FAA concluded that: "the option of having a single statutory regime and
regulatory officer oversee a demonstrated commercial space program throughout its
operational lifecycle would allow consistent application of regulatory philosophy and safety
oversight and be more efficient and cost effective for the launch operator as well as the
licensing agency." 138 The FAA determines, "for an evolving industry, a regulatory
environment that can adjust to accommodate changes would allow for more flexible and more
responsive oversight." 1 3 9
The SPACE Act creates a system of insurance and license guidelines under 51
USCA §50914 known as The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Activities Liability Insurance
and Financial Responsibility Requirements. 14 0 The statute states:
[W]hen a launch or reentry license is issued or transferred under this
chapter, the licensee or transferee shall obtain liability insurance or
demonstrate financial responsibility in amounts to compensate for the
maximum probable loss from claims by a third party for death, bodily
injury, or property damage or loss resulting from an activity carried out
under the license; and the United States Government against a person for
damage or loss to Government property resulting from an activity carried
out under the license. 141
This statute establishes three key requirements to regulate space, licenses, liability insurance,
and compensation for damages. The statute differentiates itself from the Convention on
Liability by implementing requirements for licenses and liability insurance for commercial
entities. The licenses and liability insurance allow the government regulatory power of
commercial entities within U.S. jurisdiction to compensate for damages imposed. 142 The
statute creates a system of annual reports conducted by the DOT to update the insurance cost
required for these commercial entities to pay. 143 This allows U.S. Federal Courts a fixed
amount of capital to award for damages because any liability claims fall within federal
jurisdiction under 51 USCA §50914. 144 The system of licenses allows the Federal
Government to regulate which commercial entities can launch satellites as well as collect
appropriations from these commercial entities to be used for a designed purpose; however, the
145
statute is vague on which department or agent has access to these funds.
The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Activities Liability Insurance and Financial
Responsibility Requirements issues a cap on liability for damages sustained for one launch or
reentry. It states, "[a] licensee or transferee is not required to obtain insurance or demonstrate
financial responsibility of more than [S]500,000,000 [under third party]; or [$]100,000,000
137 Federal Aviation Administration, Report to Congress: DOT/FAA Approach to Enabling Non-Launch
Flight
Operations of Space Support Vehicles Related to Commercial Space Transportation (Jun. 29, 2017).
138

Id.
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See 51 U.S.C.A. §50914 (West 2015).
51 U.S.C.A. §50914 (West 2015).
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142 See
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id.

Id.

4 Id.
145

See id.

276

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol18/iss2/9

18

Hermer-Fried: Kessler Syndrome: A United States' Statutory Solution for Satelli
KESSLER SYNDROME: A UNITED STATES' STATUTORY SOLUTION FOR
SATELLITE DEBRIS REMOVAL AND THE MITIGATION OF ORBITAL COLLISIONS
for the government; or the maximum liability insurance available on the world market at
46
The insurance policy
reasonable cost if the amount is less than the applicable amount."
applies to the license -holder as a flat rate and does not increase for each satellite in operation.
These rules mean that a licensed entity operating a megaconstellation of thousands
of satellites need not have adequate reserves or insurance to cover the damage it is likely to
create. This acts as a massive subsidy to protect the companies that are causing the largest
problems - launching large numbers of satellites with no plan for cleaning up the resulting
mess. As a result, launchers have a strong incentive to not plan for the retrieval of their
satellites and instead to retreat to default or bankruptcy protection in the event of an accident.
The OST criticizes the U.S. licensing system for not streamlining a system for
47
The OST reasons, "the
regulation as well as not complying with the Outer Space Treaty.1
U.S. utilizes license conditions to implement its international obligations and to safeguard
public interests, but utilizes separate frameworks for licensing launch and reentry, remote
sensing, and communications."1 4 8 These frameworks do not provide clear avenues through
which the U.S. Government can fulfill its "Outer Space Act Art. IV" obligations in relation to
49
the newly contemplated commercial space activities.1
C.

Government Licenses for Commercial Entities

Currently, the system in place for licenses does not go far enough to prevent Kessler
Syndrome. Apparently, the agencies believe that stable and limited regulation promotes
commercial gain. 50 However, absent immediate action, Kessler Syndrome will eliminate all
that gain.
To prevent Kessler Syndrome the international community needs a license system
that enforces punitive damages on corporations that create orbital debris, even without
negligence or intentional wrongdoing.
The license system currently enforced by the FAA is meant to give the U.S.
jurisdiction over the corporations and to implement regulations when needed, instead of
enforcing regulations that are necessary for preventing Kessler Syndrome.
In contrast, a licensing regulation intended to prevent Kessler Syndrome would
mandate U.S. Corporations involved with satellite manufacturing, shipping, supplying,
financing, and launching to obtain a specialized license so that the designated U.S. agency can
monitor which organizations are involved in the industry and hold them liable for violating
the regulations. For the license system to enforce regulations the licenses must apply not only
to subsidiaries, but also to the parent/holding companies when indemnifying for liability
damages.

51 U.S.C.A. §50914 (West 2015) ("An insurance policy or demonstration of financial responsibility
protects .. . the following, to the extent of their potential liability for involvement in launch services or reentry
services, at no cost to the Government: the government; executive agencies and personnel, contractors, and
subcontractors of the Government; contractors, subcontractors, and customers of the licensee or transferee;
contractors and subcontractors of the customer; space flight participants").
147 See Holdren, supranote 123.
'4'
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id.

1so See Federal Aviation Administration, supra note 137.
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D.

U.S. Space Regulation Going Forward

In 2018, the FCC took a more active role in combating the threat of Kessler
Syndrome. Ajit Pai, Chairman of the FCC, states "[o]rbital debris is going to be a critical
thing going forward, we want to make sure we have rules in place to protect against
debris.""' According to NASA, "To prevent a serious long-term debris problem, 99 percent
of the spacecraft must de-orbit within five years after they complete operations. ,,152 From a
technical standpoint, ensuring de-orbit after 5 years is extremely difficult. 15
The FCC plans to overhaul their guidelines for Orbital Debris Mitigation established
in 2004. The FCC believes "a significant increase in the number of satellites ... in orbit ...
have the potential to increase the amount of orbital debris, thus mitigating the growth of
orbital debris is more critical than ever to ensure continued, safe operations in space." 5 4 The
regulations must be updated because "the increase in satellites includes proposed
constellations of hundreds of thousands of satellites .. . plan to operate at orbits above 650
kilometers . . . [and] will not de-orbit within 25 years, the current limit for post-mission
orbital lifetimes in FCC guidelines."1 55 The FCC is proposing a rule "requiring companies
requesting a license for non-geostationary orbit ("NGSO") systems that seek to operate at
altitudes above 650 kilometers5 6to explain their rationales for selecting those orbits and 'any
other relevant characteristics"'
Donald Kessler is skeptical of whether moving debris to different altitudes is an
effective method in preventing orbital collisions as, "there is less tractable debris except when
you get around 1,500 kilometers but every time an event occurs, the breakup scatter things
both high and low. We really don't know for sure what the environment looks like at these
high altitudes." 5 7
V.

SOLUTION

A multifaceted legal solution is necessary to prevent Kessler Syndrome. The first
step is to create a system of enforceable liability claims against corporations. Second,
corporations must be required to abide by the international regulations established under the
Outer Space Treaty. The current international legal framework to enforce liability on
corporate entities for the creation of orbital debris is ineffective.
Under Article VII of the current Outer Space Treaty, each State is responsible for
the torts of the non-governmental entities it has jurisdiction over,' 8 but there is no content
supporting that responsibility. The Convention on Liability has been incapable of holding
any corporation liable for the 500 break-ups, collisions, explosions, or other fragmentation
151 Jess Foust, FCC to Seek Comment on Revised Orbital Debris Guidelines,
SPACE NEws (Nov. 13, 2018),
https://spacenews.com/fcc-to-seek-comnent-on-revised-orbital-debris-guidelines/.

152 See Werner, supra note
51.
153
154
155

Id.
Foust, supra note 151.
Id.

156 Id.

1s7 Werner, supra note 51.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Jan. 27, 1967, 19 UST 7570.
15s
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events that have already happened.'" 9 There is no practical proven method to cleanup the
debris in orbit. The cost to clean up a single piece of orbital debris is estimated between $100
and $500 million.1 60
The IADC requires that satellite operators de-orbit their satellites 25 years after the
life of the satellite.16 1 Experts think the 25-year period to de-orbit is too long and will hasten
Kessler Syndrome. 16 Experts also think corporations will not follow the 25-year policy,
163
Moreover, the average lifespan of a
because de-orbiting regulations are not being enforced.
corporation listed in the S&P 500 is 15 years,' so it is possible that a launching corporation
may simply cease to exist before it is required to de-orbit. In order to force corporations to
comply with the international regulations, a new legal framework must be' created with the
goal of holding corporations liable for the damages they cause.
The licensing system already established by the U.S. forces the individual
commercial entities involved in the manufacturing, launching, and operation of satellites to
receive a license from the Federal Government. '6 These licenses give the U.S. Federal
Government jurisdiction over the corporations in liability claims. '66 The licensing
requirements extend to not only the subsidiaries, but to the parent/holding company.
68
Accordingly, the U.S. has jurisdiction over the majority of commercial satellites in orbit.
Building on the U.S.'s leading role in space activity, this note proposes a solution that meets
the goals of the U.S. Federal Government for the regulation of the commercial space sector,
while also preventing Kessler Syndrome.
Currently, satellite corporations licensed by or under the jurisdiction of the U.S. are
not being held liable for the creation of orbital debris or their failure to de-orbit dead
satellites. Under International Law, the U.S. is in violation of IADC regulations and is not
enforcing the terms of The Convention on Liability. To ensure that corporations follow the
international regulations, this note proposes a Federal Statute that punishes corporations for
creating orbital debris.
A.

Proposal: Component I

This note proposes a new U.S. statute to require commercial satellite license holders
to provide financial security for every satellite launched into orbit. The security's purpose is
to ensure the license holder is able to repay the U.S. Government for any expenses the latter
would incur to de-orbit the licensee's satellites or fulfil its responsibilities for the creation of

159
160

See Pekkanen, supra note 26.

See Choudhury, supra note 22.

161 See Werner, supra note 51.
162 id.
163

Id.

See Kim Gittleson, Can a company live forever?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2012),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-16611040 (illustrating most of the corporations that cease to exist are
absorbed into other corporations, so liability does not necessarily disappear).
165 See 51 U.S.C.A. §50914 (West 2015).
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTIST, supra note 23.
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orbital debris should the licensee fail to do so. The U.S. Government will hold the security in
escrow in the U.S. Treasury for the duration of the satellite's life and until the satellite
successfully de-orbits.
Secondly, the time period within satellite launches must retrieve the satellite and any
associated debris will be reduced from 25-years to 7-years after the death of the satellite.
International law rules will be changed to conform.
Upon de-orbiting the satellite, the corporation will receive the security with any
accumulated interest. However, if the corporation fails to de-orbit the satellite in the required
time, the security will be used to indemnify any injured party, including the public if the
debris remains or whoever ultimately pays for de-orbiting. Should the corporation fail to deorbit its satellite by the required date, it will forfeit its security. Each time a corporation (or
its successors) fails to de-orbit, the security amount for future launches will increase and the
firm, or its successors and associates, will be required to make additional retroactive security
payments with respect to any other satellites then in operation that it developed, launched or
operates. Additionally, the government shall re-estimate the cost of retrieval and de-orbiting
from time to time, and if that cost increases, the security associated with each currently
orbiting satellite shall be increased commensurately. 169
For each satellite that remains in orbit, the government shall bill launchers for the
balance on an on-going basis, until the satellite is successfully removed or retrieved. To the
extent that launchers do not pay, all associated corporations, including manufacturers,
operators and customers of the satellite, will be jointly and severally liable to pay the security
amount.
This system of indemnification is permissible under The Convention on Liability.
According to Article XI, "nothing shall prevent a State ... from pursuing a claim in the courts
or administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching State." 7 o
The U.S. Treasury would then provide the Office of International Science and
Engineering funds equal to the security deposit, to be used for research and development of
technology and mechanisms designed to remove orbital debris.17 1 By having a federally
funded and coordinated research program, the U.S. would be investing in the future use of
space. This is critical because only the Federal Government can organize and fund a project
at the scale necessary to clean the orbit.
The proper regulatory channels within the U.S. will determine the security amount.
Most likely this should be the DOT, which currently sets the maximum liability insurance
pursuant to ... . The new legislation should instruct the DOT to set an accurate security price,
avoiding the sort of gross underestimate it used in its 2015 calculation of maximum liability
insurance.

This increase in the security should not result in a symmetrical decrease in security if estimated costs drop
rather than increase. If the security deposit is larger than necessary to cover the costs of de-orbiting, the
licensee may recover any overpayment in full, with interest, by arranging for de-orbiting itself in a timely
fashion. It should not benefit if it, instead, simply abandons cleanup to the public sector.
170 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T.
2389.
17' Note that this means the U.S. is spending a security deposit long before it acquires any right to the funds.
Presumably if the licensee does retrieve, the U.S. will have to retroactively pay for this R&D out of general tax
revenues.
169
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Since there is no current practical method to clean orbital debris, any security
amount must be largely speculative based on an economic model. Thus, the government must
recalculate the predicted expenses from time to time as better information comes in. If the
cost of de-orbiting/cleaning debris is determined to be greater than the initial estimate, the
government must retroactively increase bond amounts for all previously launched satellites as
well as new ones.
The security amount is not a cap on liability, but only a partial assurance that the
liable party will be able to fulfill its obligations. The current cap on liability would be
eliminated.
In order to assure that risk is spread rather than placed on insolvent parties or
otherwise avoided, the statute should also provide for to piercing the corporate veil in any
case when damages caused by the commercial entity surpass the value of the security and the
insurance payout, regardless of the usual limits on piercing the veil remedies.
The rationale for creating a statutory piercing the corporate veil provision is to
ensure that liable corporations pay damages. In many ways the system proposed mirrors that
of the Superfund statute.17 Most corporations that are licensed to launch, manufacture, and
operate commercial satellites are privately held subsidiaries of a holding/parent company.173
The piercing the corporate veil provision will ensure that these subsidiaries will not default on
paying damages by claiming insolvency or declaring bankruptcy while their parent or
affiliated companies remain solvent. In order to further limit corporate entities from
organizing themselves in ways to circumvent the reach of the piercing the veil statute, the
government under the proposed statute could also hold investors, subcontractors, and
contractual partners liable for damages, if the security bond ends up being inadequate to cover
the damages or for launches that predate the security bond requirement. This prevents
evasion or planned avoidance by businesses when it comes to cleaning their pollution.
Given the security system's goal of covering the actual anticipated cost to remove a
satellite and the broad liability without regard to corporate form, launchers and investors can
be permitted to insure or spread the risk in any way they see fit. The present U.S. Law for
insurance is ineffective in dealing with megaconstellations as it sets a maximum- payout of
17 4
The amount in losses caused by satellite collisions in
$500,000,000 per license holder.
megaconstellation will far exceed the insurance requirement. Under the new regime,
presumably, the financial markets will find ways to spread this risk quite broadly; otherwise,
launchers and their investors will be reluctant launch satellites, as they would be assuming
unlimited liability for a risk that is currently unquantifiable.
Thus, the new U.S. Statute acts as a replacement for the ineffective Claims
Commission established in The Convention on Liability.

See generally United States Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund: CERCLA Overview, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cercla-overview (last updated Jun. 4, 2018).
173 See Cas Proffitt, Top 100 Most Disruptive Space Companies in 2017, DISRUPTOR DAILY (Jun. 15, 2017),
2
https://www.disruptordaily.com/disruptive-space-companies- 017/; See generally Seth Archer, Morgan
172

Stanley: Here are 20 Companies that are Best Exposed to the Growing Space Economy, BUSINESS INSIDER

(Oct. 13, 2017, 12:46 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/space-companies-morgan-stanley-best-exposedto-the-growing-space-economy-2017-10.
174 51 U.S.C.A. §50914 (West 2015).
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B.

Proposal: Component H

In order for the solution to succeed, the international community needs to agree to
impose provisions similar to the new U.S. Statute for orbital debris liability. Otherwise,
launchers may simply avoid U.S. regulation by avoiding any U.S. presence. This note
proposes that the U.S. seek to sign an Executive Agreement with nations with a commercial
satellite presence, in which the latter agree to abide by the new U.S. Statute or enact similar
provisions under their domestic law. 17 5 This agreement should become a key U.S. priority in
renegotiating trade deals.
Conversely all active states have a compelling interest in
maintaining a low quantity debris orbit, so it should not be hard to reach a consensus. Any
remaining corporate players will likely be covered by the U.S. regime, providing that they
have some U.S. contacts. Accordingly, the new regime will require all commercial entities
launching satellites into orbit to have security held in the U.S. Treasury (or a foreign
equivalent) as insurance if they fail to de-orbit.
One additional benefit of such an Executive Agreement would be to mitigate
military concerns involving the cleanup of Earth's orbit. Government agencies and private
businesses have proposed engineering and scientific solutions for debris removal such as,
"lasers, nets, magnets, tethers, robotic arms or co-orbiting satellites."1 76 There is no guarantee
that technology designed to vaporize space debris could not also be used to destroy critical
communication and military satellites.' 77 The U.S. military has expressed concerns over
potential foreign espionage and sabotage of its satellites, through technology disguised as
satellite repair or removal mechanisms. 1 7 8 For example, the Chinese are creating a laser to
remove space debris, but the U.S. military is concerned that the laser could be used as a
weapon. 1 The same technology. that "captures or zaps or drags away debris can do the same
0
to a functioning spacecraft." 8
The goal of this note's proposal, however, is for the U.S. Office of International
Science and Engineering to take the lead in in developing technology and mechanisms
capable of removing debris from orbit. Should the funding provided by the security deposits
enable the Office to do so, the U.S. should then designate an an independent international
agency to use the technology to remove debris, thus mitigating military concerns. Thus, we
can avoid the potential space anarchy of independent, privately funded entrepreneurs,
possibly available for hire to hostile actors, creating and controlling debris-destruction tools
that could easily be weaponized.
Until there is a viable system to cleanup Earth's Orbit, Sanitation Technicians of
Space, this is the best solution given the alternative: permitting unregulated launches until
Kessler Syndrome brings an abrupt end to satellite use.
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, art. 23, Mar. 29, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389 (This agreement does not violate The Convention on Liability, since Article XXIII of the
17-

convention states, "the provisions of this Convention shall not affect other international agreements").
176 See Pekkanen, supra note
26.
177 id.
178 See Vice, supra note
48.
1' Joe Pappalardo, Could a Chinese Space Junk Laser Double as a Weapon, POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 17,
2018),
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/al5338238/china-space-junk-laser-weaponpotential/.
80 See Pekkanen, supra note 26.
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